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PRIVACY’S RIGHTS TRAP
Ari Ezra Waldman
ABSTRACT––A growing chorus of scholars, privacy professionals, and
policymakers think that individual rights of control—rights to access,
correct, and delete data, as well as rights to opt out of tracking and to have
humans in the loop of automated decision-making—are effective means of
regulating the data-extractive economy. Indeed, the argument for individual
rights is so pervasive and hegemonic that individual rights form the
backbone of every piece of privacy legislation introduced in the United
States in the last several years.
This Essay offers a comprehensive critique of that argument. Individual
rights fail to address the social harms of the information economy. They shift
the burden of privacy regulation to individuals mostly incapable of
exercising that responsibility while simultaneously giving technology
companies the power to define the practical reach of the law. Individual
rights cannot place limits on technology companies when the law has already
immunized their business models from accountability. Individual rights also
set the wrong norms: they normalize the notion that privacy should be an
individual responsibility rather than a core obligation of corporate actors.
And the history of using individual rights to solve structural problems proves
how rights crowd out necessary reform. If individual rights of control are
what pass for privacy legislation in the United States, the problems of
informational capitalism will get worse, not better.
AUTHOR––Professor of Law and Computer Science, Northeastern
University; Faculty Director, Center for Law, Information, and Creativity,
Northeastern University School of Law; Affiliated Fellow, Information
Society Project at Yale Law School. Ph.D., Columbia University; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Danielle Citron, Julie Cohen,
Woodrow Hartzog, Margot Kaminski, Neil Richards, and Salome Viljoen. I
have the individual right to make the mistakes in this Essay. But I also have
the obligation to take responsibility for them.
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INTRODUCTION
Legislators in the United States believe they have found the perfect
recipe for privacy law: individual rights of control. In state after state,1 and
in the U.S. Congress,2 policymakers are proposing and enacting privacy laws
that give us some combination of the right to access the information
companies have on us, delete it if we want, correct it if there are mistakes,
and move it to another company. This “second wave” of privacy law builds
on a “first wave” of long, impossible-to-read privacy policies and
insufficient choice.3 And yet, despite repeated criticism of both waves from

1
See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–199 (2021); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 603A.010–360 (2021); H.R. 216, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2021); S. 21-190, 73d Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); S. 893, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2021); H. 3910,
102d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021); S. 46, 192d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2021); S. 6701,
2021 Leg., 244th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021); S. 569, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 2021 Sess. (N.C. 2021); H.R. 1126,
205th Gen. Assemb., 2021 Sess. (Pa. 2021); H.R. 3741, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021); S. 1392, 2021
Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021); S. 5062, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021); S. 1614, 54th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020); H.R. 963, 2020 Leg., 122d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2020); H. 1656, 2020 Gen.
Assemb., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020); H.R. 3936, 91st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2020); L. 746, 106th Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2020); H.R. 1236, 2020 Gen. Ct., 166th Sess. (N.H. 2020); Gen. Assemb. 3255, 219th
Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2020); S. 418, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019); S. 946, 129th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Me. 2019); H.R. 1253, 2019 Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2019); S. 176, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.
2019); S. 234, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019).
2
See American Data Protection and Privacy Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong. (2022) (distributed as
discussion draft); Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2021, S. 1494, 117th Cong. (2021);
Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act, H.R. 1816, 117th Cong. (2021); Setting an
American Framework to Ensure Data Access, Transparency, and Accountability Act, S. 4626, 116th
Cong. (2020); American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019); Consumer Online
Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019); Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th
Cong. (2019); Online Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 116th Cong. (2019); Privacy Bill of Rights Act,
S. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019).
3
Ari Ezra Waldman, The New Privacy Law, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 19, 21–22 (2021).
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a host of scholars,4 individual data privacy rights persist as policymakers’
go-to.
The debate among scholars and, hopefully soon, among policymakers
is not between privacy rights and no privacy rights, or between structural
reform and no structural reform. Those who think existing rights are enough
seem to be industry mouthpieces, hopelessly naïve, or normatively
committed to neoliberal structures of power. They no longer merit our
attention. Rather, the modern privacy rights debate pits scholars who support
individual rights of control as good first steps against scholars who believe
that individual rights will do additional harm to privacy without concurrent
structural reform.
Some distinguished privacy scholars fall into in the former camp.5 They
believe that some individual rights of control are better than nothing. They
(rightly) believe that, in general, the perfect should not be the enemy of the
good.
I am in the latter camp, and this Essay explains why. Rights, like
visibility, are traps.6 Individual rights of control require an infrastructure to
4
See, e.g., Salomé Viljoen, A Relational Theory of Data Governance, 131 YALE L.J. 573, 597–603
(2021) (reviewing literature critiquing individualist approaches to privacy); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy
is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1930 (2013) [hereinafter Cohen, What Privacy is For] (critiquing
traditional privacy law’s focus on regulating information flow through notice and choice); Julie E. Cohen,
How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Mar. 23, 2021) [hereinafter Cohen,
How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law], https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-not-to-write-a-privacy-law
[https://perma.cc/Z7ZN-F5P9] (arguing that legal proposals oriented toward individual rights of control
will be ineffective); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1882–93 (2013) (highlighting both cognitive and structural limitations of selfmanaging privacy); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and Performance, 110 CALIF. L. REV. 1221,
1221, 1226–227 (2022) (characterizing most state law privacy proposals as focusing on individual rights
and critiquing that focus); Waldman, supra note 3, at 38 (similar).
5
See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Case for Data Privacy Rights (or, Please, a Little Optimism),
97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 385, 386 (2022) (arguing that the despite the flaws of “[g]rounding
data privacy law in individual rights,” individual rights nonetheless serve various purposes including
reflecting common understandings of privacy and defense against First Amendment challenges, among
other goals); Mike Hintze, In Defense of the Long Privacy Statement, 76 MD. L. REV. 1044, 1045 (2017)
(suggesting the value of privacy statements is in informing consumers of their rights and choices).
6
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.
1995) (1977). The famous sentence—“[v]isibility is a trap”—comes from Foucault’s discussion of the
panoptic prison, which replaced the traditional dungeon’s darkness with full light so prison guards can
maintain watch over prisoners at all times. The legibility of the prisoner at all times reduced the prisoner’s
freedom even more. Id. Critical scholars and, in particular, those writing from the perspective of queer
and critical race theory, have made a similar argument—namely, that greater legibility of populations at
risk of discrimination, stigma, and harm is actually more dangerous than the obscurity and invisibility of
marginalization. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Towards a Theory of State Visibility: Race, Poverty, and
Equal Protection, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 965, 982–83 (2010) (discussing Foucault’s visibility
concept in relation to women in poverty receiving state-subsidized prenatal care); Ryan Goodman,
Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 643, 687–88 (2001) (discussing Foucault’s visibility concept in relation to LGBTQ individuals).
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make them meaningful, and that infrastructure does not exist in the law of
informational capitalism. 7 Nor does any piece of privacy legislation
currently under consideration create that infrastructure. 8 After a brief
overview of where privacy law currently stands, this Essay offers five
critiques of the primacy of individual rights in privacy laws. First, the social
critique focuses on the mismatch between individual rights and the social
nature of data in informational capitalism. When rights go first in a
regulatory model for data-extractive capitalism, our coordinated
subordination is ignored. Second, a behavioral critique argues that people
are, for the most part, incapable of exercising their individual rights. When
rights go first, little will change on the ground because few of us will be able
to exercise those rights. Third, a practical critique demonstrates how even
those who support individual rights of control implicitly recognize that rights
only have real power with structural reform. When rights go first, they cannot
overcome preexisting legal and technical barriers to effective enforcement.
Fourth, an expressive critique challenges the message of individual
responsibility sent by rights-based laws. When rights go first, law
perpetuates the idea that privacy is our problem alone to manage. Finally, a
fifth structural critique argues that individual rights have always been a
convenient yet ineffective quarter-baked solution to throw at a structural
problem. When rights go first, they almost always crowd out rather than pave
the way for real reform.
I am not prepared to give the information industry the gift of weak
regulation. Nor am I prepared to let policymakers legitimize a subordinating,
data-extractive business model simply because they have no better ideas than
individual rights. In fact, rights-based laws will make the problem worse.
I.

WHERE PRIVACY LAW STANDS

Privacy law has developed in two waves. In the first wave, often
described as “notice and choice,” companies that extract information from
us are required to post privacy policies on their websites.9 We are supposed
to read those policies, decide if our privacy preferences align, and then
choose some other website if not. In practice, notice and choice provides
7
Informational capitalism describes a political and economic system in which the means of
production are oriented toward the extraction of value from data and information. JULIE E. COHEN,
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 5–6 (2019).
8
To be frank, I am not even sure individual rights have any benefits whatsoever, but I am willing to
assume they do for the purposes of this Essay and to engage in constructive debate with my colleagues.
See infra Sections II.D–II.E.
9
See Waldman, supra note 3, at 24, 27–28; Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Alexander J.
Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas B. Norton, Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice
Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 490 (2015).
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neither notice nor choice.10 Privacy policies are long, written in legalese, and
impossible for even experts to process accurately. 11 Choice is also
nonexistent when only a few companies dominate a digital space, when
merely using a website is considered consent, and when the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has historically been more focused on helping the
information industry rather than regulating it.12
The first wave grew out of the Fair Information Practice Principles, or
FIPPs. The FIPPs are best practices developed by the U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services in 1973 for those who collect and hold user data.13
They include the principles that individuals should know what information
will be collected, that they should be able to access their data, that they
should be able to make corrections and have their data deleted, and that they
should be able to opt out of certain types of data collection.14 Regarding data
collectors, the FIPPs suggest transparency about their data collection and
data use practices, minimization of their collection of information where
possible, use of effective security when storing data, and general data
accuracy.15 And yet, the first wave was strictly about providing individuals
with notice of data use practices and the opportunity to consent. The other
FIPPs were deprioritized.
For the second wave, policymakers went back to the same menu, but
didn’t skimp on the sides. Second wave proposals include a right to access,
a right to delete, a right to correct, and a right to opt out of tracking or the
sale or transfer of data.16 Some proposals prohibit retaliation for opting out.17
A few have a right to object to data processing and a right to human review
of automated decisions. 18 Of course, a rights-based regime also requires
internal structures of compliance to evaluate and process access, deletion,

10
See Saturday Night Live, Coffee Talk: Helen Hunt Is a Family Friend, YOUTUBE, at 02:30
(Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1-D8DjGhfw [https://perma.cc/KMX7-S5UY]
(discussing how chickpeas are neither chicks nor peas).
11
Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 491, 494–95 (2015). For a summary of broad critiques of the
notice and consent framework, see id. at 490–96.
12
Waldman, supra note 4, at 1233, 1258–60.
13
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41–42 (1973).
14
See id. at 40–41.
15
See id. at 41–42.
16
Waldman, supra note 3, at 27–28.
17
Id. at 28.
18
Id. at 28–29.
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correction, and opt-out requests. 19 But policymakers clearly prioritize
individual rights over all else.
II. A CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS
Why is that so bad? Who could be against rights? Both waves of privacy
law revolve around personal responsibility, presumptions of human
rationality, and the notion that we could achieve some measure of privacy by
relying on individuals on their own clicking this or that button. This is a
fantasy. This Part outlines five reasons why using individual rights to
regulate data-extractive capitalism is not just insufficient, but also
counterproductive.
A. The Social Critique
The information economy is a social economy. Decisions to consent to
data collection are never purely personal decisions. Instead, one person’s
decision to consent to sharing their information frequently implicates others
sharing some sort of connection with them. The most obvious example of
this is when a family member decides to send their saliva to 23andMe to map
their DNA. By doing so, they share information about everyone who shares
their DNA (parents, sisters, children, and so forth). In a social economy,
individual rights do not control what happens with our data. This is the social
critique of individual rights.
In fact, the “sociality” of data is the core feature of the information
economy. 20 That is, information about one person doesn’t just affect that
person; it affects everyone like them. Producers extract profit from data
specifically because data collected about one person helps them make
inferences about other people.21 If I purchase several books about the history
of Paris or buy in-home exercise equipment, retailers and platforms can
assess my latent characteristics (age, education, income, location, sexual
orientation, relationship status, you name it) and target others with similar
characteristics with advertisements for Mary McAuliffe’s book, Paris, City
of Dreams, or a new Peloton bicycle.

19
As I have described elsewhere, legislation in the second wave follows the rights/compliance
model, like the General Data Protection Regulation in the European Union. See Waldman, supra note 4,
at 1250, 1257 (describing privacy proposals in statutes, such as data deletion and opt-out tracking);
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. This Essay is about the impact of individual
rights, so it focuses on that aspect of the second wave.
20
Viljoen, supra note 4, at 582.
21
Id. at 610–11.
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This puts us all in data relationships with each other that individual
rights—which we alone can exercise against data collectors—entirely
ignore.22 A person wrongfully arrested because a facial recognition algorithm
identified them as a suspect is socially connected with the person whose
voluntarily uploaded picture was used to train the facial recognition tool.
Critically, although the individual arrested certainly has a privacy interest in
the collection, use, and processing of data related to their face, that interest
is independent of the interests of the person who uploaded the picture,
thereby starting the causal chain of picture, collection, processing, training
artificial intelligence, misidentification, and arrest. The victim’s privacy
interest—and their interest in not being wrongfully swept up into a biased
criminal justice system—is simply not represented in the relationship
between the uploader and the host platform. And yet that “vertical”
relationship between uploader and platform is the only one even remotely
mediated by individual rights.23
Therefore, a central feature of an individual rights approach to privacy
law is its complete disregard for how an inherently social, inference-based
economy actually functions.24 It expresses a narrow, radically individuated
property interest in data that has limited value and limited reach.
B. The Behavioral Critique
I suppose it is possible that if enough of us exercise our individual rights
to delete, port, and opt out of tracking, things might change. We could
conceivably starve the information industry of the materials and labor it
needs to extract population-level insights from individual users. But much
social science evidence suggests that this will never happen. This is the
behavioral critique of individual privacy rights.
Individual rights of control presume human rationality. The right to opt
out of tracking is contingent on individuals’ ability to understand how they
are being tracked and the effects of that tracking. It then requires individuals
to process that knowledge, align it with their privacy preferences, and make
the choice to opt out or consent. But humans are not perfectly rational beings;

22
Daniel J. Solove, The Limitations of Privacy Rights, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2023)
(manuscript at 12–17), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=4024790 [https://perma.cc/9AE3-XCTQ].
23
See Viljoen, supra note 4, at 607–09 (describing data governance’s response to downstream social
effects from data collection as “unsatisfying” because of its commitment to individualism despite the
known “horizontal,” or population-based, nature of data flows).
24
Alicia Solow-Niederman, Information Privacy and the Inference Economy, 117 NW. U. L. REV.
357, 401, 404 (2022).
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at best, our rationality is bounded. 25 More likely, our rationality is
malleable.26 If policymakers expect people to exercise their individual rights
in any appreciable numbers, they will likely be disappointed.
Individuals must overcome all sorts of biases that cause them to pump
the brakes on acting, let alone acting rationally. We face status quo biases
that make us more comfortable with maintaining things as they are.27 We
face problems of overchoice, where the sheer number of choices and steps
we must take to opt out of cookies creates paralysis.28 We are also prone to
hyperbolic discounting, or the tendency to overweigh the immediate
consequences of a decision and to underweigh those consequences that may
occur in the future.29
Data tracking often carries with it certain immediate benefits—
convenience, access, or social engagement, to name just a few. But
individuals usually do not immediately feel its costs, whether the intangible
costs of risk and anxiety or the delayed costs of identity theft and loss of
autonomy. 30 Therefore, our tendency to overvalue current rewards while
inadequately discounting the cost of future risks makes us much less likely
to exercise our right to opt out. Our disclosure decisions are also subject to
framing biases, especially when platforms describe opting out of tracking as
being harmful: 31 “If you don’t allow cookies, website functionality will be
diminished,” or, “Opting into data collection will enable new and easier
functionality.”
At the same time, platforms are free to manipulate these choices
however they want. Sure, they can place a hyperlink to “Access My Data”
25
ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI & JENS GROSSKLAGS, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About
Privacy, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES 363, 369–70 (Alessandro
Acquisti et al. eds., 2008).
26
See generally Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Malleable Rationality, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 17 (2018)
(arguing that rationality changes due to time, experience, and policy).
27
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
28
See Benjamin Scheibehenne, Rainer Greifeneder & Peter M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many
Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload, 37 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 409, 409 (2010).
29
Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox’, 31 CURRENT OP.
PSYCH. 105, 106 (2020); see also Solove, supra note 22 (manuscript at 10–12) (discussing how privacy
rights are not meaningful if individuals do not have the time or knowledge to invoke them with respect
to their data).
30
See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms,
96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 756–60 (2018) [hereinafter Solove & Citron, Data Breach Harms]; Danielle Keats
Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. 793, 830–61 (2022) [hereinafter Citron &
Solove, Privacy Harms].
31
Idris Adjerid, Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Sleights of
Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the Limits of Transparency, SOUPS ‘13: PROC. 9TH SYMP. ON
USABLE PRIV. & SEC. 1, 10 (2013).
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somewhere on a webpage, but they can use design tricks to obscure it,
redirect us, and manipulate behavior.32 As a sociotechnical process, design
includes “processes that create consumer technologies and the results of their
creative process instantiated in hardware and software.” 33 The field of
science and technology studies has long recognized that the design of built
environments constrains human behavior.34 The same is true online, and even
more so when millions, if not billions, of people with potentially different
preferences are using the same service. As Woodrow Hartzog has noted,
“[t]he realities of technology at scale mean that the services we use must
necessarily be built in a way that constraints our choices.”35 We can only
click on the buttons or select the options presented to us; we can only opt out
of the options from which a website allows us to opt out.
At a minimum, the power of design means that our choices do not
always reflect our real personal preferences. At worst, online platforms
manipulate us into keeping the data flowing, fueling an information-hungry
business model. That manipulation is often the result of so-called “dark
patterns” in platform design. Dark patterns are “interface design choices that
benefit an online service by coercing, steering, or deceiving users into
making decisions that, if fully informed and capable of selecting alternatives,
they might not make.”36 And they are common.37 Designers use dark patterns
to hide, deceive, and goad. They confuse by asking questions in ways most
people cannot understand, they obfuscate by hiding interface elements that
could help protect privacy, they require registration and associated
disclosures in order to access functionality, and they hide malicious behavior
in the abyss of fine print. Policymakers should not expect us to act rationally
when they have left in place a business model that does everything it can to
trigger us to act against our own interest.
C. The Practical Critique
Cognitive limitations are not the only barriers standing in the way of us
exercising our individual rights. Practical barriers also impede our privacy
32

Waldman, supra note 29, at 107.
WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT 11 (2018).
34
See, e.g., Steve Woolgar, Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, 38 SOCIO. REV. 58,
59–60 (1990) (arguing that “our preconceptions about the nature and capacities of different entities shape
what counts as legitimate accounts of action and behaviour” in the context of information technology).
35
Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 423, 426
(2018).
36
Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J. Friedman, Eli Lucherini, Jonathan Mayer, Marshini
Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites,
3 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 1, 2 (2019).
37
See id.
33
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rights. Individual rights have no effect when rights holders cannot act on
them or when they fail to hold violators accountable for their actions.
Throwing a few dollars—even a few million dollars—at state attorneys
general or administrative agencies will, at most, hold a company or two
accountable for the most egregious or most obvious lies and other wrongs.
The leading privacy law proposal in the U.S. Congress does not include any
money for any enforcement mechanisms at all.38 And even if regulators have
enforcement capacity, the laws are still weak. Regulators estimate that
compliance with the supposedly “stringent” law out there39—the California
Consumer Privacy Act—will only cost $128 per business.40 Although even
proponents of individual privacy rights can see the insufficiency of rights
without money for enforcement or meaningful regulation, there is a deeper
problem. Rights-based privacy laws are tossing individual rights into zones
of legal immunity that insulate the information industry from
accountability.41
Rights-based privacy laws include rights to access the information a
company has about us. 42 Some of them also include rights against
discrimination. 43 That means we can click a button, download pages and
pages of data, and scour them for evidence of exclusion or mistreatment.
Good luck! There are several reasons why few of us can turn that into a
meaningful check on the information industry. Technical experts such as
computer scientists, electrical engineers, programmers, and data scientists—
and those with means to pay them—are the ones most likely able to
understand the data we receive. Few of us have access to either. The
algorithms that make decisions about people’s lives are protected by trade
secrecy law or immunized from any kind of regulation as creative expression
under the First Amendment.44 Therefore, even if we could understand what
the information industry was doing to us, too much of its business behavior
is off limits from any sort of accountability.
The Supreme Court exacerbated this problem in TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez when it took away Congress’s long-standing power to ensure that
violations of acts of Congress automatically confer Article III standing.45
38

American Data Protection and Privacy Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong. § 401 (2022).
Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1734 (2021).
40
CALIFORNIA PRIVACY PROTECTION AGENCY, CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT
REGULATIONS: ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2022).
41
COHEN, supra note 7, at 101–07 (2019).
42
A comprehensive review of these proposals can be found at Waldman, supra note 4, at 1250–51.
43
See, e.g., id. at 1277.
44
COHEN, supra note 7, at 17, 89–91, 261–63.
45
141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)).
39

97

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

This means that even if Congress were to give us individual privacy rights,
flagrantly denying us those rights would not be ground for a lawsuit.
If individuals want to exercise a private right of action, a much-touted
addition to privacy laws that is supposed to give them some real teeth,46
litigants need to identify concrete and particularized harm over and above a
company’s brazen disregard of our statutory rights.47 But U.S. courts have
been notoriously and consistently unwilling to recognize anything but the
most obvious pecuniary harms in privacy cases.48 Invasions of privacy can
cause myriad harms; Daniel Solove and Danielle Citron have identified
fifteen clusters of harms, included among them are physical, economic,
reputational, psychological, autonomy-based, discrimination-based, and
relational harms.49 Courts could recognize those harms, but they just don’t.50
Introducing individual rights of control into a legal system that built a wall
around data-extractive conduct and is utterly uninterested in recognizing the
gravity of privacy rights is like putting a feather on a weight scale: it won’t
register.
D. The Expressive Critique
Law has expressive value.51 It sends messages about what is right and
wrong.52 It sets norms.53 Privacy laws that elevate individual rights of control
send two messages: (1) that privacy is an individual right against others and
that privacy is the individual’s responsibility and (2) that it is up to us to
manage what happens to data extracted from our social behaviors. Both are
wrong, misguided, and ill-suited to the threats posed by the information
economy.

46
See Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Rights of Action in Privacy Law, 63 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1639, 1644–45 (2022) (arguing that private enforcement of privacy regulations can marshal resources not
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48
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to mitigate the risk of identity theft or fraud, and emotional distress caused by data breaches—have been
rejected by courts); Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra note 30, at 816–19.
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Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra note 30, at 830.
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Privacy scholarship began with individual rights. To Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis writing in 1890, privacy was a “right ‘to be let alone.’”54
Privacy was “solitude” and a “retreat from the world,” particularly from a
press that was increasingly intruding into their lives. 55 Almost 100 years
later, in 1967, the canonical privacy scholar Alan Westin was still
conceptualizing privacy as individuals’ right to decide for themselves when,
how, and to whom to disclose information.56
But in the decades since, privacy scholars have rightly recognized the
limitations of the individual model. Privacy is about facilitating social
interaction, not stopping it.57 It is “shorthand for breathing room to engage in
the processes of boundary management that enable and constitute selfdevelopment. So understood, privacy is fundamentally dynamic.” 58 And,
importantly, privacy is about power. As Neil Richards notes, “[s]truggles
over ‘privacy’ are in reality struggles over the rules that constrain the power
that human information confers.”59 And that power is an important piece of
social structure that determines who has access to the “common relationships
in contemporary commercial and civic life.”60 Privacy theory, Julie Cohen
argues, “should acknowledge that fact.”61
The law and technology scholar Margot Kaminski argues that because
privacy is commonly understood as an individual right against others,
grounding privacy law in individual rights makes intuitive sense and would
align with individuals’ expectations. 62 Even assuming this individualized
vision is dominant among nonexperts, that mere fact is no reason to codify
those conceptions into law. It is instead a powerful reason for law to push
back to frame privacy as a collective goal of democratic governance. Law
can, and should, set stronger norms.
Legislation focused on individual privacy rights of control also sends a
message about personal responsibility. The privacy scholar Daniel Solove
used the phrase “privacy self-management” to describe practices of notice
and choice.63 Individual rights-based laws double down on this model. They
put the onus on us to monitor and regulate what happens with extracted data.
And we are simply not up to that task at scale. There are simply too many
54
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56
57
58
59
60
61
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Id. at 196.
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Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy As Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age 69–71 (2018).
Cohen, What Privacy is For, supra note 4, at 1906.
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Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 22 (2019).
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See Kaminski, supra note 5, at 2.
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choices, privacy policies, buttons to toggle, and cookies to understand. Plus,
even if it were possible for us to manage all that on our own, the information
economy is so vast and opaque that individuals will always lack enough
information about the downstream effects of data processing to make
informed decisions.
Individual responsibility will not solve collective problems. In fact,
corporate interests use the discourse of individual responsibility as a shield
to deflect accountability. We see it all the time, and nowhere more
prominently than in the discourse around climate change.
For decades, polluters—such as large oil companies, plastics producers,
and the coal industry—have worked to keep the conversation about climate
change and its solutions focused on the consumer.64 As Geoffrey Supran and
Naomi Oreskes have found, polluters use rhetoric of climate “risk” and
consumer energy “demand” to downplay the reality and seriousness of
climate change, normalize fossil consumption, and individualize
responsibility. 65 These communications and marketing strategies have
allowed polluters to effectively minimize the appearance of their role in
climate change and challenge climate litigation, regulation, and activism.66
This makes polluters “part of a lineage of industrial producers of harmful
commodities that have used personal responsibility framings to disavow
themselves.”67
Here’s another example: “The container industry spent tens of millions
of dollars to defeat key ‘bottle bill’ referendums in California and Colorado,
and then vigorously advanced recycling—not reuse—as a more practical
alternative.” 68 The industry did this because recycling “stress[es] the
individual’s act of disposal” and shifts responsibility away from the producer
that inundates the market with plastic in the first place. 69 The push for
recycling, therefore, is part of a discourse that gives life to a “diagnosis of
environmental ills that places human laziness and ignorance centerstage.”70
The result is predictable inaction on the things that could actually save our
64
See, e.g., Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Rhetoric and Frame Analysis of ExxonMobil’s
Climate Change Communications, 4 ONE EARTH 696, 706, 710 (2021) (finding that ExxonMobil
disproportionately employed rhetoric to present consumers as responsible for the cause of and treatment
for global warming); Walter Lamb, Keep America Beautiful: Grassroots Non-Profit or Tobacco Front
Group?, 8 PR WATCH 1, 1 (2001) (describing the infamous “crying Indian” ad that expressed the idea
that cleaning up the environment was an individual’s responsibility, not the tobacco industry’s).
65
Supran & Oreskes, supra note 64, at 706, 708.
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Id. at 708, 710–11.
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planet: “When responsibility for environmental problems is individualized,
there is little room to ponder institutions, the nature and exercise of political
power, or ways of collectively changing the distribution of power and
influence in society—to, in other words, ‘think institutionally.’” 71 This is
why the plastics industry has waged a decades-long, multimillion-dollar
campaign to perpetuate the myth of plastic recyclability and to push
recycling—a decidedly individual-focused effort—as the ultimate solution
to our impending climate catastrophe.72
The information industry is taking its cues from big polluters.
Technology companies publish statements about transparency, 73 but fire
researchers as soon as their scholarship highlights biases and erasure
encoded in profitable algorithms. 74 Industry mouthpieces will focus on
consent and access when any issue comes up, 75 but never speak about
industry’s power to control the collection and processing of data without any
accountability from independent researchers. 76 The industry will spend
millions of dollars focusing on making data use policies more readable, but
then begin to design an entire virtual world that is data extractive at its core.77
Information companies protect their bottom line by utilizing these sleight of
hand tactics to distract the public with empty gestures while continuing to
collect and sell their private data.
That said, is individual responsibility really that bad? Following the
climate analogy, it makes sense for us to reduce our carbon footprints even
if other regulatory responses could have more impact. It’s something, and
something is better than nothing. But is it? As the next Section suggests,
individual rights often crowd out other regulatory options. By sending a
message of individual responsibility, the information industry ensures that
collective, corporate responsibility dies.
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E. The Structural Critique
Individual rights are classic liberal responses to social problems.78 But
individual rights, as described by critical legal theorists, can be
indeterminate: “[N]othing whatever follows from a court’s adoption of
some” new legal right for individuals.79 They can also be pyrrhic victories:
“[W]inning a legal victory [recognizing an individual right] can actually
impede further progressive change.”80 This is precisely what is happening
with individual privacy rights of control.
Paul Butler illustrates the “critique of rights” in the context of the right
to counsel for indigent defendants. Butler argues that Gideon v.
Wainwright, 81 long regarded as a milestone in criminal justice because it
guaranteed poor criminal defendants the right to be represented by an
attorney, “obscures” the real problems of the criminal justice system.82 The
reason “prisons are filled with poor people, and that rich people rarely go to
prison” is not that the former have no lawyers and the latter have all the good
ones; rather, it is “because prison is for the poor, and not the rich.”83 Butler
recognizes that Gideon itself did not create a carceral state that imprisons
poor people of color at rates far higher than any other group.84 Instead, Butler
argues that by providing indigent defendants with counsel—that perfect
patina of procedural due process, especially from the lawyer’s perspective—
Gideon legitimized a broken, racist system and diffused political resistance
to structural change.85 Gideon did not ensure that poor Black people would
be “stopped less, arrested less, prosecuted less, incarcerated less.”86 It gave
defendants a fairer process, but also made it harder for social movements to
argue that the system was broken. In other words, Gideon threw an individual
right at a structural problem, promised us that rights would make the
structural problem less of a problem, and, ultimately, made the problem
78
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Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 32 (1993). That said, many scholars
have been more charitable about rights, recognizing their discursive and organizing potential. See, e.g.,
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410 (1987) (“[R]ights rhetoric has been and continues to be an effective form of
discourse for blacks.”).
80
Tushnet, supra note 79, at 26; see Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1051–52 (1978) (referring to the legitimizing capacities of legal doctrine).
81
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
82
Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2178
(2013).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 2178–79.
86
Id. at 2191.
79

102

117:88 (2022)

Privacy's Rights Trap

worse. 87 The carceral state grew, and it grew even more skewed against
people of color. 88 But it maintained legitimacy because Gideon gave
defendants equal process.
By focusing on each individual defendant’s right to counsel, Gideon cut
off collective action. As Wendy Brown noted, rights discourse “convert[ed]
social problems into matters of individualized, dehistoricized injury and
entitlement.” 89 It diverted scholarly and policymaker attention to the
boundaries of the right and away from the pressing need to find actual
answers to the problems of mass incarceration of poor people of color.
The discourse of individual responsibility did the same thing in the
climate change context. Studies show that merely reminding individuals of
their own past efforts and actions to reduce energy consumption decreases
support for government action on climate change. 90 Individual household
behavior crowds out public support for government action by creating the
perception of sufficient progress.91
In the privacy space, individual rights look good on paper. Legislators
will throw some rights at a political and economic problem, point to the bill
they passed, and say, “Look what we did!” When, inevitably, the dataextractive economy makes headlines for its privacy invasions, manipulative
tactics, and violations of civil rights—none of which are limited by
individual rights—conservative and neoliberal policymakers will claim that
too much regulation stifles innovation, insist they addressed the problem,
and go home.92 Individual rights leave extractive business models wholly
intact. As a result, privacy social movements—already hamstrung by the
mostly invisible nature of information age harms—and privacy civil
society—heavily invested in their seats at the table—will be less able to
galvanize interest in structural reform. If we start with individual rights, we
will likely end with them, too.
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III. PRIVACY LAW BEYOND RIGHTS
This Essay is a critique of individual privacy rights as a primary weapon
against data-extractive capitalism. It has demonstrated the shaky ground on
which rights-based privacy laws stand and their inability to constrain
manipulative, invasive, and harmful corporate behavior. But the critique of
rights is an easy target without an alternative. Privacy scholars and
policymakers need a robust toolkit to regulate informational capitalism.
Individual rights will not work. Nor will other current models work, such as
the rights-and-compliance models embraced by the General Data Protection
Regulation in the European Union.93
A moderate approach might try to strike an acceptable balance between
privacy and the monetization of data. A more radical approach might begin
from the premise that the data-extractive, behavioral advertising-based
business model of informational capitalism is structurally invasive, abusive,
and subordinating, and therefore requires wholesale regulation and change.
This Part briefly outlines what either approach might look like, leaving to
forthcoming work the task of laying out new proposals in detail. That the
political environment today may not be ripe for more radical proposals is no
reason to give up; it is instead the strongest rationale possible for framing a
more robust alternative right now. We need to move the politically
acceptable range of policies before it’s too late.
A moderate approach could significantly boost funding for the FTC to
create and enforce regulations. 94 The FTC and the Department of Justice
could become more aggressive at enforcing anticompetition law so that
individuals obtain real power to choose between companies depending on
their privacy practices. The FTC could require regular audits to ensure
database accuracy, with annual reporting requirements and substantial
punishments for failure. To regulate algorithmic decision-making systems
that use vast amounts of data to make predictive, probabilistic decisions
about people, the FTC could write a rule mandating a “minimum level of
quality” in algorithmic decisions.95 Some scholars have proposed a right to
restitution from the ill-gotten gains from data collected by manipulative or
misleading practices. 96 Data minimization—the notion that companies
should only be allowed to collect and retain data that is absolutely necessary
to achieve a previously defined and disclosed purpose—should be
aggressively enforced.
93
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These are just a few examples of a moderate approach to regulating data
use in the information economy. They are, however, reformist.97 They leave
intact an underlying labor- and data-extractive business model that
subordinates every participant in the digital economy. A more radical
approach—what André Gorz called “non-reformist reforms”—might target
that business model directly. 98 A radical response to the harms of
informational capitalism might prohibit companies from using data for
behavioral targeting and ban location tracking. It would subsidize openaccess, not-for-profit Internet intermediaries that would become a
counterweight to the extractive information industry. It could ensure
transparency and public interrogation of algorithmic decision-making
processes by removing corporate trade secrecy protections for automated
systems they sell to the state.
Importantly, structural changes in how the law is implemented in
practice are also necessary. As Julie Cohen has described, the law of
informational capitalism is managerial; it reflects values of efficiency and
productivity, relies on informal processes such as audits and consent decrees,
and depends on public–private partnerships in which regulated entities are
responsible for policing themselves.99 The managerial information economy
reflects the will and the interests of managers and leaders of government,
those with strong interests in the status quo and the revolving door of
industry and government.100 We need the rule of law to shrink the power of
corporate compliance departments that weaponize processes of legal
managerialism, such as privacy impact assessments, record keeping, and
audits. There are several ways to do this. Law can circumvent compliance
departments; giving up trade secrecy protections and bans on behavioral
advertising do not require procedure-oriented compliance. Law can also
force compliance departments to take privacy seriously, particularly by
providing a robust “public” option in which privacy and public interest are
core pieces of the mission. In the end, the law needs to assert authority over
powerful information economy actors and relieve individuals of an
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impossible task––securing illusory control over their privacy one website at
a time.
CONCLUSION
This Essay warns against relying on individual rights to protect privacy.
The rights model is a gift to the information industry. Individuals can
exercise their rights to delete their data and to transfer it if they wish, but
policymakers’ focus on individual responsibility entirely ignores those who
are primarily responsible for the manipulation, subordination, and
commodification at the heart of informational capitalism. Nor is it enough to
say that individual rights should be one piece in a larger regulatory regime.
When legislators begin with individual responsibility, they rarely, if ever,
follow through with the kind of structural regulation that could make
individual rights meaningful. Therefore, the individual rights model is a trap,
laid for us by corporate actors and captured lawmakers content with
symbolic performances of regulation.
In the end, scholars on both sides of the individual privacy rights debate
agree that policymakers are not doing enough. Where we depart is on the
value of individual rights. Some see them as a critical piece of a larger
regulatory structure. Others fear they will crowd out more robust options of
accountability. And some feel that individual rights-based laws are the best
we can expect in the current political environment. I think they’re worse than
nothing, for the reasons I describe above. Although we need both voices in
the privacy debate, I fear that we skeptics will be right. If we are, and if
policymakers refuse to change course, then we all lose.
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